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The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was released
the same year the term “phishing” was coined. The Act provided administrative, physical, and
technical safeguards to implement for security standards with “required” and “addressable”
implementation specifications. Since that time, the healthcare technology landscape has
tremendously changed. This study explores four questions: What is the observed (reported)
trajectory (frequency) of cases of ransomware attacks compared to other types of data breaches?
What are examples of ransomware cases that are not reportable based on HIPAA regulations?
What are the examples of the “worst-case” consequences of inadequate protection against
ransomware attacks? Which HIPAA regulations should be changed or updated to protect against
ransomware? The data shows a significant increase by year in ransomware p<.026, malware
p<.006, phishing p<.008, unauthorized access p<.000 and hacking incidents p<.000. Also, 24%
of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)1.1. Cybersecurity Framework did
not map to HIPAA Security. The study suggests that healthcare organizations should adopt and
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implement a cybersecurity framework, and the United States Department of Health & Human
Services (HHS) should consider an update to the HIPAA Security standards.
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background and Need
Historically health care organizations used information technology for different

functions. For instance, specific information systems were designed to collect patient
registration information, other systems manage hospitals' daily census, while others managed
laboratory results. In 1996 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
was passed to streamline the flow of healthcare information across providers and insurers.
HIPAA specified how personally identifiable information should be handled to protect the
confidentiality of patient information. The HIPAA regulations focused on assuring patient
confidentiality and the prevention of identity theft and fraud. However, information systems
were still small, disjointed, and locally limited to accomplishing simple tasks, like record storage
and billing. However, this began to change rapidly in 2001, when the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) released a report on the state of healthcare quality. The report encouraged healthcare
organizations to switch from paper records to electronic medical records. The use of electronic
records would provide readily available data to increase care quality and outcomes (Hurtado,
Swift, & Corrigan, 2001).
The momentum for the broader use of electronic medical data proliferated. In January
2004, President George W. Bush declared in his State of the Union address that all paper health
records should be electronic within the next ten years. The plan envisioned electronic medical
records would provide the necessary information for proper care to patients (“State of the
Union,” 2004). Later that year, the New York Times published a Commentary by Republican,
Newt Gingrich and Democrat, Patrick Kennedy, depicting how the US healthcare was still
operating in an antiquated delivery system not advantageous to the technology age of the 21st
8

century (Gingrich & Kennedy, 2004).
Despite the health system critique in the IOM report, President George W. Bush’s Health
Information Technology Plan, and bipartisan agreement by Newt Gingrich and Patrick Kennedy
for the need to increase the use of health information technology implementation did not
accelerate. The speed of adoption of the broader use of Electronic Health Record (EHR) data
fast-tracked with the passing of the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health (HITECH) Act, which is part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
This act brought incentives by way of meaningful use of health information technology before
there was a widespread adoption of EHR (Blumenthal, 2010).
Over the next seven years, EHR adoption was rapid. Data from the ONC/American
Hospital Association (AHA), AHA Annual Survey Information Technology Supplement, 2015,
showed 95 percent of all hospitals had a certified electronic health record system (Office of the
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, 2018). The adoption of health
information technology brings many advantages. Some of the benefits include improved
outcomes, care quality, cost savings, and greater engagement of patients in their health care. A
recent review of studies conducted since the adoption of Health Information Technology (HIT)
showed positive results (Buntin, Burke, Hoaglin, & Blumenthal, 2011).
However, the emergence and swift adoption of Health Information Technology has
produced critical challenges. As use and systems have grown, so has the risk to patient
confidentiality and record security. The basic premise behind HIPAA assuring patient
confidentiality and prevention of identity theft and fraud may be inadequate to meet the
challenges posed by organized cyber-crime groups that target the organization’s function merely
to gain profit from stealing individual patient records.
9

Healthcare has become increasingly dependent on technology for most functions of
patient care. Computerized Provider Order Entry (CPOE), Digital Imaging and Communications
in Medicine (DICOM), Computed Tomography Scanners (CT), Electronic Medical Records/
Patient Management (EMR), Decision Support System (DSS) as well as other computerized
systems are vital components of patient wellness and outcomes. However, what happens when
you cannot reach these systems due to the denial of service from a ransomware attack? That is
the essential difference between the original objectives of HIPAA security requirements and the
security needs of contemporary health care systems. This study will focus on one of the most
severe threats to modern medical care information systems posed by ransomware.
Ransomware initially began in 1989 when a biologist Joseph L. Popp gave 20,000
attendees from 90 different countries a 5.25 disk at an AIDS conference sponsored by the World
Health Organization (Wadell, 2016). The meeting informed attendees that the diskette contained
a computer-based questionnaire that would allow researchers and health professionals the ability
to determine a person's risk of contracting AIDS (Wadell, 2016). However, the disk did not just
contain a questionnaire; it also included a digital ransom that did not execute until the 90th boot
of the floppy (Wadell, 2016). The ransom required the user to send a cashier’s check for to
licensing fee to gain access to their data (Wadell, 2016).
Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts files, making them unreadable by the
owner (Fruhlinger, 2018). Malware, which is short for “malicious software,” includes: viruses,
adware, rootkits, spyware, ransomware, trojan horses, remote access, worms, and keyloggers
(Fruhlinger, 2019). Malware breaches organizations' perimeter and allows criminals access to
and the ability to steal valuable information. In 2017, several large organizations experienced
major breaches that exposed consumer information such as Equifax with 145 million, Yahoo
10

with 3 billion, and Uber paid hackers $100,000 to cover-up 57 million stolen customers
information (Larson, 2017).
Researchers at IBM completed a study in 2016 and found the incidence of ransomware
attached to spam emails rose from 0.6% in 2015 to 40% in 2016 (Limor, 2016). The same study
found that 70% of organizations that experienced a ransom attack paid the charges (Limor,
2016). Of the 70% that paid the ransom, 20% spent more than $40,000 to regain access to
critical information (Limor, 2016). Another survey found that globally, healthcare organizations
and financial institutions were most susceptible to ransomware attacks (Osterman Research Inc,
2016). For example, in 2017, five of the eleven healthcare information breaches were related to
ransomware (Spitzer, 2017).
Verizon’s annual data breach investigative report found 76% of breaches were financially
driven (Verizon, 2018). Although some ransomware comes in the form of phishing and spearphishing, other breaches take advantage of network vulnerabilities. For example, SamSam
ransomware gains access through direct remote desktop protocol systems setup on public IP
addresses (Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,
2018). Some variants of SamSam also steal users' credentials and other information sold on the
darknet for other illegal activities (Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, 2018). A malware review report published in the first quarter of
2016 showed that 93% of healthcare phishing emails included ransomware (PhishMe, 2016b). A
report completed on hacking trends of 2016, found a 400% increase in ransomware attacks, and
91% of cyber-attacks began from spear-phishing, which increased by 55% from 2015 (PhishMe,
2016a).
In 2017, large organizations beyond healthcare also experienced significant breaches. In
11

May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware attacked Bayer and Siemens medical Windows-based
devices connected to the network (Brewster, 2017). The attack on the medical devices provides
another level of concern on healthcare quality and care coordination when critical equipment and
data become unavailable. In this case, the Bayer and Siemens radiology equipment monitors the
amount of contrast agent given to the patient during an MRI (Brewster, 2017). Research
completed by the College of Healthcare Information Management Executives (CHIME) stated
that 18 percent of provider devices were infected by malware or ransomware in the past 18
months (Van Wagenen, 2018). In 2017, Johnson & Johnson sent out a warning of security issues
found in their insulin dispensing units (Hay Newman, 2017). The notices cautioned the risk of
the IoT hacking risk that could provide remote access and change the amount of insulin
dispensed (Hay Newman, 2017). Medical equipment with the ability to administer over
prescribed doses could affect patient care and have unintended outcomes.
Based on the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) Breach Report data shows as of December 2018, the top 10 breach incidences
affected a total of 7,024,560 individuals (Davis, 2018). These breaches were a result of email,
spear-phishing, ransomware, malware, File Transfer Protocol (FTP), and web misconfiguration.
One notable case on July 9, 2018, Cass Regional Medical Center diverted all trauma and stroke
patients as well as shut down its EHR system because of a ransomware attack (HealthITSecurity,
2018). Another case, on September 18, 2018, Lutheran Hospital in Fort Wayne, Indiana,
canceled all elective surgeries because of a virus that affected over 100 Lutheran Health Network
facilities (Spitzer, 2018a).
Shortly before these, on April 9, 2017, Erie County Medical Center employees noticed
one of their workstation showing a ransom threat requesting $44,000 in bitcoin to unlock all
12

hospital files (Slabodkin, 2018). To stop the spread of the infection, Erie County Medical Center
leadership went ahead and brought all systems down. Upon investigation, it was determined the
SamSam ransomware infected the systems. There were over 6,000 individual systems affected,
and it took the hospital six weeks to bring systems back online. Although Erie County Medical
Center’s systems were offline, they kept access to all data through cloud-based HEALTHeLINK
software. The hospital invested in real-time writing to and from their Meditech EHR and
HEALTHeLINK. The simultaneously stored written records resulted in minimal downtime from
the time the ransomware attack and the real-time access to the electronic medical records
(Slabodkin, 2018).
Hackers count on the fact that healthcare organizations rely on electronic patient records
for up-to-date information for care delivery (Zetter, 2016). Lack of proper medical history can
influence patients’ outcomes. Many hospital emergency rooms divert patients or delay surgery
and other services during a ransom attack (HealthITSecurity, 2018) (Spitzer, 2018a). Delays in
critical care due to ransomware could create an unintentional effect on patient outcomes.
Recently, emergency room residents completed training to simulate a system brought
down due to ransomware at Maricopa Medical Center. In the exercise, an emergency room
resident treats a patient that arrived with a stroke; however, the CT scan was offline and
completely unavailable due to a ransom attack. Without the CT scan, the resident could not
determine if the cause of the stroke was by a clot or a bleed. The resident completed a treatment
simulation based on conjecture; however, the prognosis showed that even though the patient
would survive, he or she would sustain severe brain damage (Wetsman, 2019).
Healthcare organizations have the highest rate of data breaches compared to any other
industry (Alford, 2018). Personal health and insurance information are more valuable on the
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dark web than social security. Stolen social security numbers yield $2 to $25 per number, while
health and medical records profit from $10 to $1,000 (Radware, 2018). The only other stolen
information worth more is passport information at a rate of $1000 per individual (Radware,
2018). Stolen protected health information can cause healthcare fraud and problems for the
consumer.
The risk of stolen identity is not always known until well after a ransom attack. For
example, a woman, Deborah Ford had her purse stolen and was arrested two years later for
buying more than 1,700 prescription opioid painkiller pills, which she did not purchase
(Andrews, 2016). The judge eventually dismissed the case because she had proof of filing a
police report for the stolen purse. However, consumers are unlikely to file a police report when
they receive a letter in the mail concerning the breach of their healthcare information. Stolen
protected health information (PHI) can lead to expensive and fraudulent medical services,
surgeries, prescription drugs, medical devices, equipment, and changes to medical history
(Andrews, 2016).
1.2

Problem Statement
On average, there were more than one breach per day within healthcare organizations in

2017 (Spitzer, 2017). Ransomware was not taken into account when HIPAA was defined, and
the protections specified by HIPAA may be inadequate for this current threat. The utilization of
ransomware has increased over time and has become much more sophisticated since Popp’s
initial virus.
1.3

Research Questions and Research Hypotheses
The purpose of this study is to examine the trend in the use of ransomware over time. As

well as to illustrate the magnitude of the threat of ransomware and the inadequacy of HIPAA
14

reporting standards, the study will describe two cases from Allscripts and Hollywood
Presbyterian Medical Center (HPMC), which do not appear in the HHS OCR Report database.
Further, to illustrate the catastrophic consequences of ransomware attacks of two cases.
Brookside ENT & Hearing and Wood Ranch Medical, closed due to ransomware attacks.
Finally, the study will identify areas for improvement by mapping the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity 1.1 standards against HIPAA Security required
and addressable standards.
This study will explore the following research questions:
1) What is the observed (reported) trajectory (frequency) of cases of ransomware attacks
compared to other types of data breaches?
2) What are examples of ransomware cases that are not reportable based on HIPAA
regulations?
3) What are the examples of the “worst-case” consequences of inadequate protection against
ransomware attacks?
4) Which HIPAA regulations should be changed or updated to protect against ransomware?
1.4

Population
The data used for this research is from the HHS OCR Breach Report database as of

October 31, 2019 with breach submission date between January 1, 2010, and December 31,
2018. The Department of Health and Human Services 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164 Breach
Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information; Interim Final Rule requires all
breaches with 500 or More Individuals communicated in the online portal as of September 23,
2009 (US Department of Health and Services Office of the Secretary, 2009).

15

2

CHAPTER II SCOPING LITERATURE REVIEW

On January 2, 1996, the same year, HIPAA was enacted a Usenet newsgroup coined the
name AOHell (“History of Phishing,” 2018). The American Online (AOL) phishing fraud
allowed hackers to steal user password information to gain access to accounts. Once the hacker
had access, they could take credit card information of the unsuspecting users (Rekouche, 2011).
Once the hacker gained access to the credit card information, they exploited the data to create an
account with other online services such as the Sierra Network, CompuServe, GEnie, and Delphi
(Rekouche, 2011). Users received an email that stated, "Hi, this is AOL customer service. Due
to a problem with our records, we need you to reply to this message with your current password
to avoid being disconnected" (Rekouche, 2011, p. 3). The classic phishing techniques to steal
information were much like those used today. Even though phishing provided a persistent
security problem with AOL, it was not at the forefront in the development of HIPAA’s
administrative security rule.
As of March 2013, 45 CFR 164.306(a) of the HIPAA security standards says that each
covered entity must meet and follow four security requirements for ensuring confidentiality,
protection, and compliance (United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of
the Secretary, 2003)
The first requirement states that the covered entity shall make sure that all electronic
protected health information (ePHI) created, received, stored, and transmitted securely at all
times (Department of Health and Human Services, 2014).
“Ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic protected health
information the covered entity or business associate creates, receives, stores, or transmits”
(United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Secretary, 2003).
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The second requirement certifies that the covered entity assesses and manages risk in
handling and maintaining ePHI information and protects against potential threats to security
(United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Secretary, 2003).
The third requirement verifies that the covered entity continues to review and modify the
security measures through ongoing risk assessment to protect ePHI information “Protect against
any expected uses or disclosures of such information that are not permitted or required under
subpart E.” (United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Secretary,
2003).
Finally, the requirements guarantee that the covered entity supply role-based access
control to specific ePHI access based on job responsibilities. This requirement also ensures that
all workforce members received training, monitoring, and supervision on the proper use of ePHI.
This includes developing and instituting sanctions for non-compliance with policies and
procedures relating to the use of ePHI “Ensure compliance with this subpart by its workforce”
(United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Secretary, 2003).
The HIPAA Law does contain some level of ambiguity on the implementation of security
standards. Inside of the security standard, there are items considered “required” and other as
“addressable.” Based on the definition provided by OCR, “required” standards implementation
is not optional. While “addressable” provides flexibility to comply with the security standards.
The covered entity has the following options for the implementation of “addressable” standards:
a) “implement the addressable implementation specifications;”
b) “implement one or more alternative security measures to accomplish the same
purpose;”
c) “not implement either an addressable implementation specification or an
17

alternative” (Office for Civil Rights (OCR), 2013).
Allowing for optional implementation of a standard may be the reason the number of
breaches continues to increase. On January 25, 2013, HHS released a Federal Register with
modification to add the HITECH Act Final Rule. A commenter requested the removal of the
“addressable” designation from the Security Rule “because such designations lead to ambiguity
in the application of the Security Rule in the health care industry” (US Department of Health and
Services Office of the Secretary, 2013).
HHS responded with the following statement, “We decline to adopt this recommendation.
The Security Rule is structured to be both scalable and flexible, so that entities of different types
and sizes can implement the standards and implementation specifications in a manner that is
reasonable and appropriate for their circumstances. We do not mandate the use of specific
technologies, or require uniform policies and procedures for compliance, because we recognize
the diversity of regulated entities and appreciate the unique characteristics of their environments”
(US Department of Health and Services Office of the Secretary, 2013).
However, the optional nature of the “addressable” standards might be at the heart of the
problem with healthcare and cybersecurity. Also, there is a possibility that requiring the
“addressable” standards will not include enough requirements needed for proper cybersecurity
implementation. Tables 1-3 below show the security standards with those considered required
and addressable.
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Table 1: Administrative Safeguards
ADMINISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS
Standards
Sections
Required
164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) Risk Analysis
Risk
164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B)
Management
Security
Management 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(C) Sanction Policy
Process
Information

Addressable

164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) System Activity
Review
Assigned
Security
164.308(a)(2)
Responsibility

Assigned
Security
Responsibility
Authorization and/or
Supervision
Workforce Clearance
Procedure
Termination Procedures

164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A)
Workforce
Security

164.308(a)(3)(ii)(B)
164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C)

Information
Access
Management

Security
Awareness
and Training

Security
Incident
Procedures

Contingency
Plan

Isolating Health
Care
164.308(a)(4)(ii)(A)
Clearinghouse
Functions
164.308(a)(4)(II)(B)

Access Authorization

164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C)

Access Establishment and
Modification

164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A)

Security Reminders

164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B)

Protection from Malicious
Software

164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C)

Log-in Monitoring

164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D)

Password Management

164.308(a)(6)(ii)

164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A)
164.308(a)(7)(ii)(B)

Response and
Reporting
Data Backup
Plan
Disaster
Recovery Plan
19

164.308(a)(7)(ii)(C)

Emergency
Mode Operation
Plan

164.308(a)(7)(ii)(D)

Testing and Revision
Procedures

164.308(a)(7)(ii)(E)

Applications and Data
Criticality Analysis

Evaluation

164.308(a)(8)

Evaluation

Business
Associate
Contracts and
Other
Arrangements

164.308(b)(1)

Written Contract
or Other
Arrangement

(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2007)
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Table 2: Physical Safeguards

PHYSICAL SAFEGUARDS
Standards
Sections
Facility
164.310(a)(2)(i)
Access
164.310(a)(2)(ii)
Controls
164.310(a)(2)(iii)

Workstation
Use
Workstation
Security
Device and
Media
Controls

164.310(a)(2)(iv)
164.310(b)
164.310(c)

Required

Addressable
Contingency Operations
Facility Security Plan
Access Control and Validation
Procedures
Maintenance Records

Workstation Use
Workstation
Security
Disposal
Media Re-use

164.310(d)(2)(i)
164.310(d)(2)(ii)
164.310(d)(2)(iii)
164.310(d)(2)(iv)
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2007)
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Accountability
Data Backup and Storage

Table 3: Technical Safeguards

TECHNICAL SAFEGUARDS
Standards
Sections
Access
164.312(a)(2)(i)
Control
164.312(a)(2)(ii)

Audit
Controls
Integrity

164.312(a)(2)(iii)
164.312(a)(2)(iv)
164.312(b)

Required
Unique User
Identification
Emergency
Access Procedure

Addressable

Automatic Logoff
Encryption and Decryption
Audit Controls

164.312(c)(2)

Mechanism to Authenticate
Electronic Protected Health
Information

Person or
164.312(d)
Person or Entity
Entity
Authentication
Authentication
Transmission 164.312(e)(2)(i)
Security
164.312(e)(2)(ii)
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2007)

Integrity Controls
Encryption

NIST Cybersecurity 1.0 and 1.1 considers all the controls listed as “addressable” as
required in the framework regardless of the type or size of an organization. Congress created the
NIST agency in 1901 to advance measurement, innovation, and standards in science and
technology (“NIST General Information,” 2018). NIST is a non-regulatory federal agency
within the U.S. Department of Commerce. NIST's mission is to promote U.S. innovation and
industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in
ways that enhance economic security and improve quality of life (“NIST General Information,”
2018).
At the time HIPAA final Security Rule went live HHS offered four different standards
NIST standards for consideration of implementation based on supplied comments:
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1.

HIPAA Risk Management (§164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) and (B)) - NIST SP 800-30,
Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems (United States
Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Secretary, 2003).

2.

HIPAA Audit Controls (§164.312(b)) - NIST Special Publication 800–14,
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information
Technology Systems (United States Department of Health and Human Services
Office of the Secretary, 2003).

3.

NIST SP 800–16, Information Technology Security Training Requirements, A
role and performance base model (United States Department of Health and
Human Services Office of the Secretary, 2003).

4.

NIST Special Publication 800–33, Underlying Technical Models for Information
Technology Security (United States Department of Health and Human Services
Office of the Secretary, 2003).

Although these principles and models helped to shape some level of security for
information technology systems, it was not a cybersecurity framework. On February 12, 2013,
President Obama signed an Executive Order 13636 to commission NIST to develop a
Cybersecurity Framework 1.0 (The Whitehouse, 2013). The initial framework, released on
February 12, 2014, included five core functions, identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2018). Recently an updated Cybersecurity
Framework Version 1.1, released on April 16, 2018, with new improvements including Supply
Chain Risk Management added to the identify function (National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2019). The NIST Cybersecurity Framework provides essential information on
managing health information technology. However, it did not exist at the time of the HITECH
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Act’s release.
The use of information technology is not new to healthcare; however, the mandated
changes necessitated health information infrastructure overhauls. The HITECH Act promoted
the adoption of meaningful use of health information technology (Department of Health and
Human Services., 2009). To increase the adoption of EHRs CMS incentivized the program.
Through the program, eligible professionals and hospitals, including critical access hospitals that
adopt, implement, upgrade to demonstrate meaningful use of certified EHR technology, can
receive incentive payments (Congress, 2009).
The rapid shift from paper to electronic medical records and the increased use of the
internet provided higher levels of vulnerable to health care organizations. On April 8, 2014, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) cyber division Private Industry Notification indicated
health care systems and medical devices are at risk for increased cyber intrusions for financial
gain (FBI, 2014). It comes a year after President Obama issued Executive Order 13636 on
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity on February 12, 2013 (Obama, 2014). Executive
Order 13636 grew from a threat that the US was one of six countries where supervisory control
and data acquisition, a computer system (SCADA systems), had been breached (FastFlux, 2012).
SCADA systems manage and control plants and equipment in industries such as water and waste
control, energy, oil, and gas refining, transportation, and telecommunications (Inductive
Automation, 2018).
The timing for Executive Order 13636 coincides with the increasing threat of
ransomware as one of the most malicious attacks to hit health care organizations in recent
history. Data from Gemalto, a digital security company, shows of the 16 critical infrastructure
industries, healthcare had the most attacks in the first half of 2016 with 21 percent (188 out of
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888) events (Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology, 2016). Healthcare IT News and
HIMSS Analytics surveyed 61 hospitals and found that over half experienced a ransomware
attack in the past year. Also, 25 percent of the hospitals were unaware of or had no way of
knowing whether they suffered a ransomware attack (Sullivan, 2016).
Some of the significant issues facing healthcare during a ransomware attack include
business continuity and service disruptions. In September 2019, Campbell County Health
experienced a ransomware attack that affected all systems, including email and fax capabilities.
The ransomware attack of Campbell County Health, which includes The Legacy Living and
Rehabilitation Center, Campbell County Memorial Hospital, Campbell County Medical Group
with over 20 clinics, and a surgery center in Gillette, Wyoming, brought systems down for 20
days. The disruption caused the diversion of services to other area hospitals for treatment 125
miles away (McGee, 2019) (Campbell County Health, 2019).
On October 1, 2019, DCH Health System, a three-hospital system in Alabama, moved
into paper mode and diverted patients due to a ransomware attack. The diversion lasted nine
days as systems became available on October 10, 2019. The ransomware appeared to reside on
the IT systems for several months before encrypting the files of the three hospitals DCH
Regional Medical Center, Northport Medical Center, and Fayette Medical Center. The latency in
discovery may have allowed the cybercriminals the ability to steal health information and
usernames and passwords. The health system opted to pay the ransom estimated to be between
$400,000 and $700,000 to bring systems back online (Lane, 2019) (DCH Health System, 2019).
A study reviewed the quality of care of patients of hospitals after a hospital breach. The
research used the data from the HHS breach database, and the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
(PRC) database against the Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS), and the
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Medicare Hospital Compare database to review care quality. The results showed a delay in
treatment and a higher mortality rate for patients treated for acute myocardial infarction in
hospitals that had data breach attacks (Choi, Johnson, & Lehmann, 2019). Although this report
did not investigate ransomware attacks explicitly, the researcher acknowledged there would be a
higher short-term negative relationship for patient outcomes due to such attacks (Choi et al.,
2019).
Many hospitals emergency rooms divert patients, delay surgery, and other services during
a ransomware attack (HealthITSecurity, 2018) (Spitzer, 2018a). Delays in critical care due to
ransomware could supply an unintentional effect on patient outcomes. A study looked at the
impact on hospital diversion and delayed treatment of Medicare cardiac arrest patients during
transport on the day of a marathon. The study reviewed data from cities that had marathons with
closed streets that created a different route for traffic. The results showed that arrival at the
hospital took 4.4 minutes longer at the beginning of the marathon. Also, these patients had a
higher mortality rate over the first 30 days than those on non-marathon days (Jena, Mann,
Wedlund, & Olenski, 2017). The average delay to care in this case was 4.4 minutes. However,
rural hospitals such as Campbell County Health with a ransomware breach which diverted
patients 125 miles away could have a higher mortality rate.
The FBI provide guidelines in Public Service Announcement Alert Number I-091516PSA about ransomware. The message urged organization to report ransomware incidents to
federal law enforcement. The alert also calls for not paying the ransom because it does not
guarantee receiving the decryption keys. Finally, by paying a ransom, it encourages the
cybercriminal to target other victims for profit. Payment provides and incentive for other
criminals to participate in similar illegal activities for financial gain (Federal Bureau of
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Investigation, 2016).
However, some healthcare organizations end up paying the ransom at the request of their
cyber insurance carrier to bring systems back online. Lake City, Florida, used its cyber
insurance carrier Lloyd’s of London to pay the ransom of 42 bitcoin a value totaling $460,000
(Dudley, 2019). The cyber insurance policy provided the city with a $10,000 deductible of the
total amount to restore their city’s systems (Dudley, 2019). In August 2019, a ransomware
attack hit Kansas City's Truman Medical Centers. The attack did not infect any systems housing
patient data. However, the Truman Medical Centers decided to pay the ransom. The Medical
Center worked with its cyber insurance carrier to cover the cost of the ransom attack (Margolies,
2019).
Expert professors suggests that the best way to fight ransomware is by training
workforce, keep knowledgeable employees, and update operating systems and reporting attacks
regularly (Vaidya, 2017). A survey by Gartner, Inc found that the healthcare industry spends 5%
of its budget on cybersecurity.

In comparison to the banking industry, which spends 7.3% and

retail and wholesale, that budgets 6.1%, the healthcare industry is lagging. In the same survey,
82% of those hospitals responding reported having a breach. While healthcare has had to adjust
to accommodate for value-based funding and shared risks; there is a need to focus financially
building a cybersecurity infrastructure.
HIPAA provides guidance for the development of health information privacy and
security. However, with “required” and “addressable,” standards not all ransom attack incidents
become reports to the HHS OCR. HHS guided whether a ransom breach is a reportable offense
(Office for Civil Rights (OCR), 2013a). In a review of the definition of a breach, the current
rule states: “A breach is an impermissible use or disclosure under the Privacy Rule that
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compromises the security or privacy of the protected health information. An impermissible use
or disclosure of protected health information is presumed to be a breach unless the covered
entity or business associate, as applicable, demonstrates that there is a low probability that the
protected health information has been compromised based on a risk assessment of at least the
following factors:
1.

The nature and extent of the protected health information involved, including the

types of identifiers and the likelihood of re-identification;
2.

The unauthorized person who used the protected health information or to whom

the disclosure was made;
3.

Whether the protected health information was acquired or viewed; and

4.

The extent to which the risk to the protected health information has been

mitigated.” (Office for Civil Rights (OCR), 2013a)
The issue comes with the interpretation of item 3. The HITECH Act states if PHI is
“Unusable, Unreadable, or Indecipherable to Unauthorized Individuals.” Then if a breach occurs,
it does not need to be reported (US Department of Health and Services Office of the Secretary,
2013). Encrypting PHI data on systems at rest and in transmission would meet this standard.
However, the functioning behind ransomware involves encryption of all data on the healthcare
organization's technology systems. Therefore, it would be hard to determine whether the data
was acquired or viewed (Gross, 2016). Based on this premise and interpretation, ransomware
would not be a reportable offense. By March of 2016, there were at least four public
announcements of breaches relation to ransomware to healthcare organizations. David C.
Harlow, Principal, The Harlow Group, LLC, and Mac McMillan, CEO of CynergisTek, both
agreed that ransomware cripples a healthcare organization but based on interpretation of the
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HIPAA Security rule it does not need reporting to HHS (Munro, 2016).
Is HIPAA designed to address the cybersecurity issues facing health care organizations
today? Based the timeline of HIPAA and HITECH, cybersecurity legislation is lagging behind.
August 1996, HIPAA introduced. Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act to modernize information exchange in healthcare.
August 1998, Security Rule proposed. New legislation improviing security standards
to protect individual health information managed by health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and
healthcare providers.
In November 1999, the Privacy Rule proposed. The Rule improves privacy standards
and restrict the disclosure of PHI and provide better health data access for patients.
December 2000, Proposed Privacy Rule issued. The OCR is assigned the
responsibility for policing HIPAA.
In March 2002, the Privacy Rule modified. HHS mandated changes to clarify the
Privacy Rule and ease the administrative burden on healthcare providers.
February 2003, Security Standards Final Rule issued. The Final Rule required,
Covered Entities to implement appropriate Administrative, Physical, and Technical Safeguards
to protect PHI.
April 2003, Deadline for Privacy Rule compliance. The Privacy Rule requires
Covered Entities to allow patients to access their PHI on request. The Rule limits how, when,
and with whom health information is disclosed.
April 2005, HIPAA Enforcement Rule proposed. The Enforcement Rule allows for
OCR investigations and financial penalties for HIPAA violations.
April 2005, HIPAA Security Rule compliance deadline. All Covered Entities must
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comply with Security Rule requirements and implement more stringent controls for safeguarding
health records. The OCR is empowered to issue civil penalties for violations.
In March 2006, the Enforcement Rule went into effect. The OCR starts issuing
financial penalties for any Covered Entity that fails to implement the requirements of the Privacy
and Security Rules.
In February 2009, the HITECH Act signed into law. HITECH which is part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, that provided incentives to accelerate the adoption of
electronic health record systems.
August 2009, Breach Notifications Interim Regulations issued. HHS introduces new
regulations covering data breaches as part of HITECH requiring Covered Entities to report
breaches to OCR and notify potential victims.
October 2009, HITECH Act Enforcement Interim Rule issued. The Interim Rule
introduces a new tiered structure of financial penalties for HIPAA violations with four categories
of liability where fines for violations can increase to $1.5 million.
February 2010, HITECH Enforcement begins. New financial penalties for HIPAA
violations go into effect the and healthcare organizations are given notice of compliance
enforcement.
In November 2011, OCR began HIPAA compliance audits. The OCR begins a ‘pilot
round’ of 115 audits of Covered Entities to determine the state of HIPAA compliance. Only
11% pass.
March 2012, Omnibus Final Rule. The Omnibus modifies HIPAA Privacy, Security,
and HITECH Enforcement and Breach Notification Rules.
January 2013, Omnibus Final Rule issued. The Final Rule incorporates changes to
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HIPAA required by HITECH to improve data security, restrict PHI access, and prevent the use
of PHI for marketing.
In February 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order 13636. The executive
order requires a framework for improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity.
In March 2013, the Omnibus Rule was enforced. The healthcare industry provided six
months to comply before Omnibus enforcement. The breach notification rules update includes
Business Associates' liability for breaches.
February 2014, NIST Version 1.0 Framework Released. NIST releases the
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Cybersecurity Framework) as
directed in Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.
March 2014, Security Risk Assessment (SRA) Tool released. HHS Office of the
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) releases a Security Risk
Assessment (SRA) tool.
December 2015, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 signed into law. President Obama
signed into law the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. The Act establishes a mechanism for
cybersecurity information sharing among private-sector and federal government entities.
February 2016, HIPAA Security Rule Crosswalk to NIST Cybersecurity
Framework released. The mappings between the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the
HIPAA Security Rule was released to assist healthcare organization on cybersecurity
implementation.
April 2016, OCR begins the second round of HIPAA compliance audits. The second
round of HIPAA compliance audits initially scheduled for late 2014 but delayed until 2015,
commenced in April 2016.
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June 2016, HHS Office of Civil Rights released guidance FACT SHEET on
Ransomware and HIPAA. HHS Office of Civil Rights (OCR) released guidance, entitled
“FACT SHEET: Ransomware and HIPAA,” to guide breach reporting and ransomware.
September 2016, SRA Tool User Guide Version 2.0 released. HHS ONC releases
another update to the SRA Tool User Guide Version 2.0.
April 2018, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Version 1.1
released. NIST releases updated standards to its Framework for Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity with a new version 1.1.
October 2018, SRA Tool User Guide Version 3.0 released. HHS ONC releases
another update to the SRA Tool User Guide Version 3.0.
The advances in technology have changed tremendously since 1996 enactment of
HIPAA. Does HIPAA Security provide the scalability required to address the current cyberattack landscape that exists today? When implementing HIPAA, the “addressable” items
allowed the organization an option on whether to implement the standard under their discretion.
However, the University of Rochester Medical Center received a HIPAA penalty of $3 million
from non-compliance in not encrypting laptops and flash drive (HIPAA Journal, 2019a). Under
HIPAA Technical Safeguards Access Control 164.312(a)(2)(iv) and Transmission Security
164.312(e)(2)(ii) covered entities have the option to “not implement either an addressable
implementation specification or an alternative” (US Department of Health and Services Office of
the Secretary, 2013). The current technology landscape should not allow healthcare
organizations the option to skip encryption implementation.
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Definitions of Key Terms
Bitcoin is a virtual currency used by a peer to peer electronic system that works
independently of banks and, therefore, unregulated. The current market, supply, and demand
determines the value of a bitcoin, rather than a paper currency’s value (Segendorf, 2014).
Business associates are a person or entity that performs functions or activities that
involve the use or disclosure of PHI on behalf of or provides services to a covered entity (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, 2003).
Covered entity includes health plans, healthcare providers, and healthcare
clearinghouses, and healthcare providers including doctors, clinics, psychologists, dentists,
chiropractors, nursing homes, and pharmacies. Health plans include health insurance companies,
health maintenance organizations, government programs that pay for healthcare such as
Medicare, Medicaid, and the military and veterans’ health care programs (U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services, 2017).
Cyber extortion involves cybercriminals’ demanding money to stop malicious activities,
which can include stealing sensitive data or disrupting computer services (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), 2018).
Cyber insurance is a policy purchased by business to assist in coverage of liabilities
from data breaches involving sensitive customer personal health information such as
demographic information, medical histories, test and laboratory results, mental health conditions,
insurance information, and other data that a healthcare information that identifies an individual
and care they receive (Lindros & Tittel, 2016).
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Cybersecurity is “the organization and collection of resources, processes, and structures
used to protect cyberspace and cyberspace-enabled systems from occurrences that misalign from
property rights” (Craigen, Diakun-Thibault, & Purse, 2014).
Darknet, also, is known as the “dark web,” is a distinct network supporting
cryptographically hidden sites that makes stolen information available to a fraction of users of
interest in a form that permits copying (Biddle, England, Peinado, & Willman, 2003) (Moore &
Rid, 2016).
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) are “attacks
directing a high volume of network traffic to targeted computers, causing affected computers the
inability to respond. The technology system may appear down or otherwise inaccessible to
legitimate users” (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 2018).
Malware, which is short for “malicious software,” includes the following types: viruses,
adware, rootkits, spyware, ransomware, trojan horses, remote access, worms, and keyloggers
(Fruhlinger, 2019).
Protected Health Information (PHI) “refers to information that is created or received
by or on behalf of the health care component of the covered entity;”(U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services Office Office for Civil Rights, 2006). They include the following 18
identifiers:
“(A) Names;
(B) All geographic subdivisions smaller than a state, including street address, city,
county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent geocodes, except for the initial three
digits of a zip code if, according to the current publicly available data from the Bureau of
the Census’
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(C) All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual,
including birth date, admission date, discharge date, date of death; and all ages over 89
and all elements of dates (including year) indicative of such age, except that such ages
and elements may be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older;
(D) Telephone numbers;
(E) Fax numbers;
(F) Electronic mail addresses;
(G) Social security numbers;
(H) Medical record numbers;
(I) Health plan beneficiary numbers;
(J) Account numbers;
(K) Certificate/license numbers;
(L) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers;
(M) Device identifiers and serial numbers;
(N) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
(O) Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
(P) Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;
(Q) Full face photographic images and any comparable images; and
(R) Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code” (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services Office Office for Civil Rights, 2006).
Phishing is a cybercrime in which scammers send in a mass malicious email to an
individual or users of any organization by pretending to be someone known to the individual or a

35

business partner or a service provider. The intent is to trick the recipient into logging into a
website and providing personal or password information or download malware (Rashid, 2017).
Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts files, making them unreadable by the
owner (Fruhlinger, 2018).
SamSam is ransomware that exploits Windows servers to gain access to a victim’s
network and encrypting all reachable endpoints across the organization. The ransomware takes
advantage of public Remote Desktop Port RDP 3389 to access internal systems (Department of
Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, 2018).
Spear phishing targets a specific user or organization by referencing something directly
related to the recipient or by sending a malicious attachment where the filename references a
topic the recipient is interested in (Rashid, 2017).
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3
3.1

CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY

Research Design and Method
This study utilizes descriptive analysis to examine the changes in breaches over time.

Also, this study will review two entities, Allscripts and Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center
(HPMC), that affected more than 500 individuals, but did not appear in the HHS OCR Report
database. Also, this study will review two entities, Brookside ENT & Hearing and Wood Ranch
Medical closing because of ransomware attacks. Finally, the study will map the NIST
Cybersecurity 1.1 standards against HIPAA Security required and addressable standards.
Dataset Description
The initial NIST cybersecurity framework, released on February 12, 2014, was in
response to Executive Order 13636. The Framework provides best practice governance on
cybersecurity risk management guidelines. The Framework includes five core functions,
identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover.
NIST Cybersecurity 1.1 release in April 2018 included a spreadsheet with 108 categories.
NIST also mapped the categories to HIPAA to help an organization develop a cybersecurity
infrastructure. The two tables were merged by function to include the HIPAA standards. The
next step was to develop a table of the Security standards for “required” and “addressable.” The
two tables were loaded into MS SQL Server 2017 and mapped by the code of the security
standards.
Section 13402 of the HITECH Act requires covered entities to provide notification of a
breach to the Secretary of HHS. This section also requires the Secretary of HHS to post all
breaches affecting 500 or more individuals on the HHS website (US Department of Health and
Services Office of the Secretary, 2013).
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The dataset was from the HHS data breach reporting system as of October 31, 2019. The
period for the data includes January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2018. There were 189 cases
currently under review for years 2017 and 2018. The cases were identified on the internet for
their breach report either by new stories or the entity’s website to update the web description. In
total, 157 cases were found on the internet. All 189 cases was added to the archived file and
uploaded to MS SQL Server 2017. The altered table included fields for phishing, ransom, virus,
malware, “Malware and Phish” (included phishing, ransom, virus, malware), unencrypted data,
and unauthorized access/disclosure. Then a script looked for like terms in the web description.
The terms malware, virus and ransomware lines could be part of a corrective action plan. The
cases with a corrective action plan not related to the key terms were recoded and not included in
the final count.
The queried data provided totals for all providers, and the number of individuals breached
by covered entities for Business Associate, Healthcare Providers and Healthcare Plans. The data
generated maps using ArcGIS 10.4.1 for Desktop for each provider type totals and individual’s
breached (“ArcGIS 10.4.1 for Desktop,” 2015).
3.2

Independent and Dependent Variables
The dataset includes the following fields:
•

Name of Covered Entity

•

State

•

Covered Entity Type:
o Business Associate
o Health Plan
o Healthcare Provider
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•

Individuals Affected

•

Breach Submission Date

•

Type of Breach:
o Hacking/IT Incident
o Improper Disposal
o Loss
o Theft
o Unauthorized Access/Disclosure

•

Location of Breached Information:
o Desktop Computer
o Electronic Medical Record
o Email
o Laptop
o Network Server
o Other Portable Electronic Device, Paper/Films
o Other

•

Business Associate Present:
o Yes
o No

3.3

Data Analysis
Descriptive analysis were performed using Excel, SPSS, and SQL software to identify

frequencies for each research question and presented in tables and figures. The number of cases,
valid cases, and missing information included in the dataset to illustrate potential areas of
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concern in the reporting requirements. This study used an alpha level of .05 for all statistical
tests. Chi-square or linear regression analysis were used to identify statistically significant
results. A chi-square test to examine the relationship between covered entity types and breach
years.
The analysis excluded 27 cases because the web description from OCR determined that no
violation of the HIPAA laws occurred, or the entity was not a HIPAA covered entity at the time
that the incident occurred. Finally, six Healthcare Clearing House Breaches cases were removed
from the frequencies and significance testing because there were very few cases.
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4
4.1

CHAPTER IV RESULTS

Results/Findings
Research Question: What is the observed (reported) trajectory (frequency) of cases

of ransomware attacks compared to other types of data breaches?
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A total of 2,346 breaches reported during January 2010 and December 2018. The
majority (72.4%) were associated with a health care provider. The individuals affected by a
breach ranged from 500 to 78.8 million people. Approximately half (49.8%) of the breaches
were due to unauthorized access. However, 5.9% were due to ransomware, while Malware and
Phishing (includes all cases with phishing, ransom, virus, or malware) accounted for 17.5% of
the cases.
Table 4: Characteristics of reported data breaches from 2010–2018 in the research with
variable counts, Minimum, Maximum, Missing Total N, and Valid N.
Valid
Total
Valid
Variable
Frequency Percent
Percent
Missing
N
N
Covered Business Associate
331
14.1
14.1
Entity Health Plan
316
13.5
13.5
Type
Healthcare Provider
1699
72.4
72.4
Phish
201
8.6
8.6
2145
2346
201
Ransom
138
5.9
1.0
2208
2346
138
Virus
47
2.0
1.0
2299
2346
47
Malware
234
10.0
1.0
2112
2346
234
Malware and Phish
410
17.5
1.0
1936
2346
410
Unauthorized Access
1168
49.8
1.0
1178
2346
1168
Disclosure
Unencrypted Data
483
20.6
1.0
1863
2346
483
Type Hacking IT Incident
567
24.2
1.0
1779
2346
567
Web Description
1722
73.4
1.0
624
2346
1722
Frequency Minimum Maximum Missing
Individuals Affected
Calendar Year

2346
2346

500
2010
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78800000
2018

0
0

Total
N
2346
2346

Valid
N
2346
2346

The number of entities impacted by the reported breaches increase over time (Figure 1). Across all years, healthcare providers
(72.5%) were the most affected, followed by business associates (14.1%) and health plans (13.4%). The number of covered entity
occurrences of attacks showed significant increases over time (X2=.000).
Figure 1: Number of Covered Entity Breaches by Breach Year
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HHS data breach reporting system as of October 31, 2019. Time period January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2018
Year
2010
Business
Covered Associate
Entity Health Plan
Types Healthcare
Provider
Total

9

2011
45

2012
39

2013
62

2014
76

2015
14

2016
22

2017
21

2018
42

Total
330

6

19

23

18

39

57

49

51

53

315

32

135

152

191

193

192

253

282

269

1699

47

199

214

271

308

263

324

354

364

2344

43

2

X

.000

The number of individuals impacted by reported breaches increased over time (Figure 2). Across all years, individuals were
most affected by healthcare plans (58.3%), followed by healthcare providers (21.9%) and business associates (19.8%). The number of
individuals affected by attacks showed significantly increased over time (X2=.000). In 2015, Anthem, Inc., a health plan, breached
78.8 million records from one attack. When the case was removed, the data shows individuals were affected more by healthcare
providers (37.2%) followed by business associates (33.7%) and health plans (29.1%).
Figure 2: Number of Individuals Affected by Covered Entity
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HHS data breach reporting system as of October 31, 2019. Time period January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2018
Year
2010
Business
Associate
Health Plan
Healthcare
Provider
Total

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016
3,564,666
877,026

141,744
1,900,054

8,936,804
89,977

1,118,524 1,057,581
336,265
97,555

12,988,487
2,207,346

3,992,767
102,916,796

98,063
2,139,861

4,134,127
13,160,908

1,359,049 5,853,520
2,813,838 7,008,656

2,197,318
17,393,151

6,383,992
113,293,555
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2017

2018

Total

212,754
323,474

5,980,018
2,833,971

37,993,345
111,582,464

12,162,067 4,548,134
16,603,759 5,084,362

5,102,452
13,916,441

41,838,722
191,414,531

X2

.000

The number of ransomware attacks reported a significant increase over time (p=.026). The data shows 94.2% of the cases
were reported between 2016 to 2018 (Figure 3). The combined number of ransomware breaches between 2012 and 2015 compared to
2016 to 2018, showed an increase of 71% (Figure 3).

Number of Ransomware Breaches

Figure 3: Number of Ransomware Attacks by Breach Year.
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The number of virus attacks reported did not show a significant increase over time (p=.435). The data shows 80.9% of the
cases were reported between 2016 to 2018. The report also shows an increase of 833.3% from 2015 to 2016 (Figure 4). However, the
combined number of virus breaches between 2012 and 2015 compared to 2016 to 2018, only showed an increase of 9%.
Figure 4: Number of Virus Attacks by Breach Year.
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The number of phishing attacks reported a significant increase over time (p=.008). The data shows 75.6% of the cases were
reported between 2016 to 2018. The combined number of phishing breaches between 2012 and 2015 compared to 2016 to 2018,
showed an increased by 448% (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Number of Phishing Attacks by Breach Year.
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The number of malware attacks reported showed a significant increase over time (p=.006). The data shows 78.2% of the cases
were reported between 2016 to 2018. The combined number of malware breaches between 2012 and 2015 compared to 2016 to 2018,
showed an increased by 197% (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Number of Malware Attacks by Breach Year.
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The number of malware and phishing attacks reported indicates a significant increase over time (p=.001). The measure
combines unduplicated counts of breaches identified as phishing, malware, ransomware, or virus. The purpose is to determine the
increase of malicious external electronic and malicious software attacks to healthcare systems. The data shows 80% of the cases were
reported between 2016 to 2018. The combined number of malware and phishing breaches between 2012 and 2015 compared to 2016
to 2018, showed an increased by 319% (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Number of Malware and Phishing Attacks by Breach Year.
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The number of unencrypted data attacks reported did not show a significant increase over time (p=.695). The report shows
28.4% of the cases were reported from 2016 to 2018 (Figure 8). Combining the number of unencrypted data breaches between 2012
and 2015 compared to 2016 to 2018, showed a decrease in breaches by -60.4%.
Figure 8: Number of Unencrypted Data Attacks by Breach Year.
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The number of unauthorized access/disclosure attacks reported showed a significant increase over time (p=.000). The data
shows 56.3% of the cases were reported between 2016 to 2018. The combined number of unauthorized access/disclosure breaches
between 2012 and 2015 compared to 2016 to 2018 showed an increase of 29% (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Number of Unauthorized Access/Disclosure Attacks by Breach Year.
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P Value
.000

The number of hacking IT incident attacks reported showed a significantly increased over time (p=.000). The data shows
72.8% of the cases were reported between 2016 to 2018. The combined number of hacking IT incident breaches between 2012 and
2015 compared to 2016 to 2018, showed an increased by 168% (Figure 10).
Figure 10: Number of Hacking IT Incident Attacks by Breach Year.
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The number of covered entities reporting a breach by state ranged from Idaho with 2 (less than 1%) and California with 246
(12%). New York, 115 (5%), Florida, 129 (6%), Texas, 179 (8%), and California, 246 (12%) reported over 100 covered entities
experiencing a breach between January 2010 and December 2018.

Figure 11: Map of Distinct Number of Providers Reporting a Breach by State from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2018.
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The population rates for Figure 13 standardized the measures from Figure 12 across each of the 50 states, Washington DC, and
Puerto Rico. Without the calculation, larger states would artificially indicate a higher number of individuals affected compared to
smaller states, as observed in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Map of Number Individuals Affected by Breach by State from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2018.
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Figure 13: Map of Number Individuals Affected by Breach by State per 10,000 people from January 1, 2010, to December 31,
2018.
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Research Question: What are examples of ransomware cases that are not reportable
based on HIPAA regulations?
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center and Allscripts do not have a report on the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights Breach Portal.
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center
According to the 2016 Breach Report: Protected Health Information, Hollywood
Presbyterian Medical Center (HPMC) was considered the first publicized healthcare organization
in the US to become victim to ransomware attacks (Redspin, 2017). On February 5, 2016,
HPMC lost access to all systems when ransomware encrypted all files on their network. To
regain access to their data, they paid $17,000 in Bitcoin currency to decrypt all files.
During the 10-day ransomware attack, HPMC’s 400-bed hospital did not have access to
their information systems (Slayton, 2018). The organization had to resort back to paper and fax
machines to support care delivery services until paying the ransom, when records were restored
(Slayton, 2018). Although HPMC paid $17,000 for the return of their records, the total costs of
labor and lost productivity during this period are unknown. Also, there is no information on the
quality of care issues that may have occurred from delays in services, or from the inability to
access critical patient information due to the lack of system access. Finally, no information
exists on corrective action plan put in place to avoid future attacks.
Allscripts Healthcare Solutions
On January 18, 2018, the SamSam ransomware brought down 1,500 medical practices
that relied on Allscripts until January 26, 2018 (Spitzer, 2018b). Allscripts maintains services
for over 2,500 hospitals, 24,000 physician practices, and 19,700,000 consumers (Allscripts,
2019). According to Allscripts, the ransomware attack that impacted two of their data centers
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(Black & Olis, 2019). The outage caused many smaller physician practices to resort back to
paper after having no access to medical records, labs, scheduling, or payment systems (Sweeney,
2018).
Many of the providers had an issue with the response and communication by Allscripts.
Their communication team appeared to indicate that the issue affected a small number of
customers (Sweeney, 2018). It is unknown how many people were affected by the Allscripts
SamSam ransomware.
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center and Allscripts did not file a breach report.
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center may not have been aware of the reporting requirement
for ransomware because it was new and on the rise in 2016. Part of the assumption behind
ransomware is that PHI data is not accessed or viewed but only encrypted.
However, all ransomware variants behave and attack differently. In the case of the
SamSam ransomware, the attacker gains access through direct remote desktop protocol systems
setup on public IP addresses (Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, 2018). This could leave systems open to obtain other vital passwords on the
infected system before encryption. A covered entity can review traffic logs and forensics to
determine PHI’s destination during a breach. The issue with Allscripts is that they are a covered
entity with a Business Associate Agreement to manage and transact PHI data. Allscripts was
down for eight days, and none of the covered entities that they have contracts with reported the
breach. The covered entities should have filed the report to investigate the problem at Allscripts.
Based on the HITECH Act Breach Notification, it is not clear where the break down occurred in
reporting. However, all ransomware is not the same and should be reported.
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Research Question: What are examples of “worst-case” consequences of inadequate
protection against ransomware attacks?
Brookside ENT & Hearing
Smaller independent practices have fewer resources, and inadequate access to experts to
fight against ransomware. One such practice, Brookside ENT & Hearing encountered a
ransomware attack that encrypted all their records. The ransom requested $6,500 for the file’s
encryption key. The physicians decided not to pay the ransom because they were not sure where
they would get the key to unlock the files. Also, there was no guarantee that hackers would not
ask for more money. When the ransom was not paid, the hackers deleted all the encrypted files
leaving the practice without any medical records. The office contacted as may patients as
possible, but they were unable to reach all of them as they lacked contact information after the
loss of the records. The physicians decided to retire after this attack and close the offices
completely (HIPAA Journal, 2019b).
Wood Ranch Medical
Wood Ranch Medical, another small practice, will also close because of an August 2019
ransomware attack. The statement on the home page of the Wood Ranch Medical website states
they were a victim of a ransomware attack. All the patients' personal healthcare information was
encrypted and could not be restored. As a result, the practice closed in December 2019. The
practice reached out to 5,835 patients to explain the reason for the closure and to contact credit
reporting agencies to monitor their credit (Wood Ranch Medical, 2019) (HIPAA Journal, 2019c).
The four cases reviewed Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, Allscripts, Brookside
ENT & Hearing, and Wood Ranch Medical were not part of the analysis. Wood Ranch Medical
is posted on the HHS breach website; however, Brookside ENT & Hearing was not listed. Both
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incidents occurred in 2019. Based on the web descriptions of previous cases, there may not be a
penalty or additional obligation under the HITECH Act because they will no longer be
considered covered entities.
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Research Question: Which HIPAA regulations should be changed or updated to protect against ransomware?
The NIST Identify (ID) function contains 29 subcategories. Figure 14 and Table 5 shows the results of the mapping for
HIPAA "Required" and "Addressable" Standards under the Identify Function.

Figure 14: NIST Identify Function mapped to the HIPAA Security Standards
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Table 5: NIST Identify Function Mapped to HIPAA Security
Function
Category
Subcategory
Asset Management (ID.AM): ID.AM-1: Physical devices and systems within the
The data, personnel, devices, organization are inventoried
systems, and facilities that
ID.AM-2: Software platforms and applications within
enable the organization to
the organization are inventoried
achieve business purposes
ID.AM-3: Organizational communication and data
are identified and managed
flows are mapped
consistent with their relative ID.AM-4: External information systems are
importance to organizational catalogued
objectives and the
ID.AM-5: Resources (e.g., hardware, devices, data,
organization’s risk strategy.
time, personnel, and software) are prioritized based on
their classification, criticality, and business value
ID.AM-6: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for
the entire workforce and third-party stakeholders (e.g.,
suppliers, customers, partners) are established
IDENTIFY (ID)
Business Environment
ID.BE-1: The organization’s role in the supply chain
(ID.BE): The organization’s is identified and communicated
mission, objectives,
ID.BE-2: The organization’s place in critical
stakeholders, and activities
infrastructure and its industry sector is identified and
are understood and
communicated
prioritized; this information
ID.BE-3: Priorities for organizational mission,
is used to inform
objectives, and activities are established and
cybersecurity roles,
communicated
responsibilities, and risk
ID.BE-4: Dependencies and critical functions for
management decisions.
delivery of critical services are established
ID.BE-5: Resilience requirements to support delivery
of critical services are established for all operating
states (e.g. under duress/attack, during recovery,
normal operations)
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Required Addressable
R

A

R
R

A

R
A

R
R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

Governance (ID.GV): The
policies, procedures, and
processes to manage and
monitor the organization’s
regulatory, legal, risk,
environmental, and
operational requirements are
understood and inform the
management of cybersecurity
risk.
Risk Assessment (ID.RA):
The organization understands
the cybersecurity risk to
organizational operations
(including mission,
functions, image, or
reputation), organizational
assets, and individuals.

Risk Management Strategy
(ID.RM): The organization’s
priorities, constraints, risk
tolerances, and assumptions
are established and used to
support operational risk
decisions.
Supply Chain Risk
Management (ID.SC):
The organization’s priorities,

ID.GV-1: Organizational cybersecurity policy is
established and communicated
ID.GV-2: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities are
coordinated and aligned with internal roles and
external partners
ID.GV-3: Legal and regulatory requirements
regarding cybersecurity, including privacy and civil
liberties obligations, are understood and managed
ID.GV-4: Governance and risk management processes
address cybersecurity risks
ID.RA-1: Asset vulnerabilities are identified and
documented
ID.RA-2: Cyber threat intelligence is received from
information sharing forums and sources
ID.RA-3: Threats, both internal and external, are
identified and documented
ID.RA-4: Potential business impacts and likelihoods
are identified
ID.RA-5: Threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and
impacts are used to determine risk
ID.RA-6: Risk responses are identified and prioritized
ID.RM-1: Risk management processes are established,
managed, and agreed to by organizational stakeholders
ID.RM-2: Organizational risk tolerance is determined
and clearly expressed
ID.RM-3: The organization’s determination of risk
tolerance is informed by its role in critical
infrastructure and sector specific risk analysis
ID.SC-1: Cyber supply chain risk management
processes are identified, established, assessed,
managed, and agreed to by organizational stakeholders
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R

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R
R
R
R

A

constraints, risk tolerances,
and assumptions are
established and used to
support risk decisions
associated with managing
supply chain risk. The
organization has established
and implemented the
processes to identify, assess
and manage supply chain
risks.

ID.SC-2: Suppliers and third party partners of
information systems, components, and services are
identified, prioritized, and assessed using a cyber
supply chain risk assessment process
ID.SC-3: Contracts with suppliers and third-party
partners are used to implement appropriate measures
designed to meet the objectives of an organization’s
cybersecurity program and Cyber Supply Chain Risk
Management Plan.
ID.SC-4: Suppliers and third-party partners are
routinely assessed using audits, test results, or other
forms of evaluations to confirm they are meeting their
contractual obligations.
ID.SC-5: Response and recovery planning and testing
are conducted with suppliers and third-party providers
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The NIST Protect (PR) function contains 39 subcategories. Figure 15 and Table 6 shows the results of the mapping for
HIPAA "Required" and "Addressable" Standards under the Protect Function.
Figure 15: NIST Protect Function mapped to the HIPAA Security Standards
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Totals
100%
39

Table 6: NIST Protect Function Mapped to HIPAA Security
Function

Category
Identity Management,
Authentication and Access
Control (PR.AC): Access to
physical and logical assets and
associated facilities is limited
to authorized users, processes,
and devices, and is managed
consistent with the assessed
risk of unauthorized access to
authorized activities and
transactions.

PROTECT (PR)

Awareness and Training
(PR.AT): The organization’s
personnel and partners are
provided cybersecurity
awareness education and are
trained to perform their
cybersecurity-related duties
and responsibilities consistent

Subcategory
PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are issued,
managed, verified, revoked, and audited for
authorized devices, users and processes
PR.AC-2: Physical access to assets is managed
and protected
PR.AC-3: Remote access is managed
PR.AC-4: Access permissions and authorizations
are managed, incorporating the principles of least
privilege and separation of duties
PR.AC-5: Network integrity is protected (e.g.,
network segregation, network segmentation)
PR.AC-6: Identities are proofed and bound to
credentials and asserted in interactions
PR.AC-7: Users, devices, and other assets are
authenticated (e.g., single-factor, multi-factor)
commensurate with the risk of the transaction
(e.g., individuals’ security and privacy risks and
other organizational risks)

Required Addressable
R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

PR.AT-1: All users are informed and trained
PR.AT-2: Privileged users understand their roles
and responsibilities
PR.AT-3: Third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers,
customers, partners) understand their roles and
responsibilities
PR.AT-4: Senior executives understand their roles
and responsibilities
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with related policies,
procedures, and agreements.
Data Security (PR.DS):
Information and records (data)
are managed consistent with
the organization’s risk strategy
to protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of
information.

PR.AT-5: Physical and cybersecurity personnel
understand their roles and responsibilities
PR.DS-1: Data-at-rest is protected

PR.DS-2: Data-in-transit is protected
PR.DS-3: Assets are formally managed throughout
removal, transfers, and disposition
PR.DS-4: Adequate capacity to ensure availability
is maintained
PR.DS-5: Protections against data leaks are
implemented
PR.DS-6: Integrity checking mechanisms are used
to verify software, firmware, and information
integrity
PR.DS-7: The development and testing
environment(s) are separate from the production
environment
PR.DS-8: Integrity checking mechanisms are used
to verify hardware integrity
Information Protection
PR.IP-1: A baseline configuration of information
Processes and Procedures
technology/industrial control systems is created
(PR.IP): Security policies (that and maintained incorporating security principles
address purpose, scope, roles,
(e.g. concept of least functionality)
responsibilities, management
PR.IP-2: A System Development Life Cycle to
commitment, and coordination manage systems is implemented
among organizational entities), PR.IP-3: Configuration change control processes
processes, and procedures are
are in place
maintained and used to manage PR.IP-4: Backups of information are conducted,
protection of information
maintained, and tested
systems and assets.
PR.IP-5: Policy and regulations regarding the
physical operating environment for organizational
assets are met
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R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R
R

A

R

R
R
R

A

Maintenance (PR.MA):
Maintenance and repairs of
industrial control and
information system
components are performed
consistent with policies and
procedures.
Protective Technology
(PR.PT): Technical security
solutions are managed to
ensure the security and
resilience of systems and
assets, consistent with related
policies, procedures, and
agreements.

PR.IP-6: Data is destroyed according to policy
PR.IP-7: Protection processes are improved
PR.IP-8: Effectiveness of protection technologies
is shared
PR.IP-9: Response plans (Incident Response and
Business Continuity) and recovery plans (Incident
Recovery and Disaster Recovery) are in place and
managed
PR.IP-10: Response and recovery plans are tested
PR.IP-11: Cybersecurity is included in human
resources practices (e.g., deprovisioning,
personnel screening)
PR.IP-12: A vulnerability management plan is
developed and implemented
PR.MA-1: Maintenance and repair of
organizational assets are performed and logged,
with approved and controlled tools
PR.MA-2: Remote maintenance of organizational
assets is approved, logged, and performed in a
manner that prevents unauthorized access
PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined,
documented, implemented, and reviewed in
accordance with policy
PR.PT-2: Removable media is protected and its
use restricted according to policy
PR.PT-3: The principle of least functionality is
incorporated by configuring systems to provide
only essential capabilities
PR.PT-4: Communications and control networks
are protected
67

R
R

A

R

R

A
A

R
R
A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

PR.PT-5: Mechanisms (e.g., failsafe, load
balancing, hot swap) are implemented to achieve
resilience requirements in normal and adverse
situations
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The NIST Detect (DE) function contains 18 subcategories. Figure 16 and Table 7 shows the results of the mapping for HIPAA
"Required" and "Addressable" Standards under the Detect Function.
Figure 16: NIST Detect Function mapped to the HIPAA Security Standards
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Totals
100%
18

Table 7: NIST Detect Function Mapped to HIPAA Security
Function

DETECT (DE)

Category
Anomalies and Events (DE.AE):
Anomalous activity is detected
and the potential impact of events
is understood.

Security Continuous Monitoring
(DE.CM): The information
system and assets are monitored
to identify cybersecurity events
and verify the effectiveness of
protective measures.

Subcategory
DE.AE-1: A baseline of network operations
and expected data flows for users and systems
is established and managed
DE.AE-2: Detected events are analyzed to
understand attack targets and methods
DE.AE-3: Event data are collected and
correlated from multiple sources and sensors
DE.AE-4: Impact of events is determined
DE.AE-5: Incident alert thresholds are
established
DE.CM-1: The network is monitored to detect
potential cybersecurity events
DE.CM-2: The physical environment is
monitored to detect potential cybersecurity
events
DE.CM-3: Personnel activity is monitored to
detect potential cybersecurity events
DE.CM-4: Malicious code is detected
DE.CM-5: Unauthorized mobile code is
detected
DE.CM-6: External service provider activity is
monitored to detect potential cybersecurity
events
DE.CM-7: Monitoring for unauthorized
personnel, connections, devices, and software
is performed
DE.CM-8: Vulnerability scans are performed
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Required

Addressable

R

R

A

R

R

A
A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

R
R

A

Detection Processes (DE.DP):
Detection processes and
procedures are maintained and
tested to ensure awareness of
anomalous events.

DE.DP-1: Roles and responsibilities for
detection are well defined to ensure
accountability
DE.DP-2: Detection activities comply with all
applicable requirements
DE.DP-3: Detection processes are tested
DE.DP-4: Event detection information is
communicated
DE.DP-5: Detection processes are
continuously improved
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R
R

R
R

A

The NIST RESPOND (RS) function contains 16 subcategories. Figure 17 and Table 8 shows the results of the mapping for
HIPAA "Required" and "Addressable" Standards under the Respond Function.
Figure 17: NIST RESPOND Function mapped to the HIPAA Security Standards

NIST RESPOND (RS) and HIPAA Security Mapping
"Required" Only
25%

"Addressable" Only
0%

"Required" and
"Addressable" Mapped to
same Subcategory
56%

"Required" Only

Function
RESPOND (RS) %
RESPOND (RS) Count

"Addressable" Only

Not Mapped
19%

Not Mapped

"Required" and "Addressable" Mapped to same Subcategory

NIST 1.1 RESPOND (RS) and HIPAA Security Mapping
"Required" "Addressable"
"Required" and "Addressable" Mapped to
Only
Only
same Subcategory
Not Mapped
25%
0%
19%
56%
4
0
3
9

72

Totals
100%
16

Table 8: NIST Respond Function Mapped to HIPAA Security
Function

Category
Response Planning (RS.RP):
Response processes and procedures
are executed and maintained, to
ensure response to detected
cybersecurity incidents.
Communications (RS.CO):
Response activities are coordinated
with internal and external
stakeholders (e.g. external support
from law enforcement agencies).

RESPOND (RS)
Analysis (RS.AN): Analysis is
conducted to ensure effective
response and support recovery
activities.

Mitigation (RS.MI): Activities are

Subcategory
RS.RP-1: Response plan is executed during or after
an incident
RS.CO-1: Personnel know their roles and order of
operations when a response is needed
RS.CO-2: Incidents are reported consistent with
established criteria
RS.CO-3: Information is shared consistent with
response plans
RS.CO-4: Coordination with stakeholders occurs
consistent with response plans
RS.CO-5: Voluntary information sharing occurs
with external stakeholders to achieve broader
cybersecurity situational awareness
RS.AN-1: Notifications from detection systems are
investigated
RS.AN-2: The impact of the incident is understood
RS.AN-3: Forensics are performed
RS.AN-4: Incidents are categorized consistent with
response plans
RS.AN-5: Processes are established to receive,
analyze and respond to vulnerabilities disclosed to
the organization from internal and external sources
(e.g. internal testing, security bulletins, or security
researchers)
RS.MI-1: Incidents are contained
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Required

Addressable

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

R

performed to prevent expansion of
an event, mitigate its effects, and
resolve the incident.
Improvements (RS.IM):
Organizational response activities
are improved by incorporating
lessons learned from current and
previous detection/response
activities.

RS.MI-2: Incidents are mitigated
RS.MI-3: Newly identified vulnerabilities are
mitigated or documented as accepted risks
RS.IM-1: Response plans incorporate lessons
learned

R

R

A

RS.IM-2: Response strategies are updated

R

A
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R

The NIST RECOVER (RC) function contains six subcategories. Figure 18 and Table 9 shows the results of the mapping for
HIPAA "Required" and "Addressable" Standards under the Respond Function.
Figure 18: NIST RECOVER Function mapped to the HIPAA Security Standards
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Totals
100%
6

Table 9: NIST Recover Function Mapped to HIPAA Security
Function

RECOVER
(RC)

Category
Recovery Planning (RC.RP):
Recovery processes and procedures
are executed and maintained to
ensure restoration of systems or
assets affected by cybersecurity
incidents.
Improvements (RC.IM): Recovery
planning and processes are improved
by incorporating lessons learned into
future activities.
Communications (RC.CO):
Restoration activities are coordinated
with internal and external parties (e.g.
coordinating centers, Internet Service
Providers, owners of attacking
systems, victims, other CSIRTs, and
vendors).

Subcategory

Required Addressable

RC.RP-1: Recovery plan is executed during
or after a cybersecurity incident

A

RC.IM-1: Recovery plans incorporate lessons
learned

R

A

RC.IM-2: Recovery strategies are updated

R

A

R

A

RC.CO-1: Public relations are managed
RC.CO-2: Reputation is repaired after an
incident
RC.CO-3: Recovery activities are
communicated to internal and external
stakeholders as well as executive and
management teams
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There were a total of 26 (24%) NIST subcategories that were not mapped. Table 10 indicates the subcategories not mapped as
part of the cybersecurity framework.
Table 10: NIST Categories Not Mapped to HIPAA Security
Function

IDENTIFY (ID)

Category
Governance (ID.GV): The policies,
procedures, and processes to manage
and monitor the organization’s
regulatory, legal, risk, environmental,
and operational requirements are
understood and inform the
management of cybersecurity risk.
Risk Assessment (ID.RA): The
organization understands the
cybersecurity risk to organizational
operations (including mission,
functions, image, or reputation),
organizational assets, and individuals.
Supply Chain Risk Management
(ID.SC):
The organization’s priorities,
constraints, risk tolerances, and
assumptions are established and used
to support risk decisions associated
with managing supply chain risk. The
organization has established and
implemented the processes to
identify, assess and manage supply

Subcategory
ID.GV-1: Organizational cybersecurity policy is established and
communicated
ID.GV-3: Legal and regulatory requirements regarding cybersecurity,
including privacy and civil liberties obligations, are understood and
managed
ID.GV-4: Governance and risk management processes address
cybersecurity risks

ID.RA-2: Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing
forums and sources

ID.SC-1: Cyber supply chain risk management processes are identified,
established, assessed, managed, and agreed to by organizational
stakeholders
ID.SC-2: Suppliers and third party partners of information systems,
components, and services are identified, prioritized, and assessed using
a cyber supply chain risk assessment process
ID.SC-3: Contracts with suppliers and third-party partners are used to
implement appropriate measures designed to meet the objectives of an
organization’s cybersecurity program and Cyber Supply Chain Risk
Management Plan.
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chain risks.

Identity Management, Authentication
and Access Control (PR.AC): Access
to physical and logical assets and
associated facilities is limited to
authorized users, processes, and
devices, and is managed consistent
with the assessed risk of unauthorized
access to authorized activities and
transactions.
Awareness and Training (PR.AT):
The organization’s personnel and
partners are provided cybersecurity
awareness education and are trained
PROTECT (PR) to perform their cybersecurity-related
duties and responsibilities consistent
with related policies, procedures, and
agreements.
Data Security (PR.DS): Information
and records (data) are managed
consistent with the organization’s risk
strategy to protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of
information.
Information Protection Processes and
Procedures (PR.IP): Security policies
(that address purpose, scope, roles,
responsibilities, management

ID.SC-4: Suppliers and third-party partners are routinely assessed using
audits, test results, or other forms of evaluations to confirm they are
meeting their contractual obligations.
ID.SC-5: Response and recovery planning and testing are conducted
with suppliers and third-party providers
PR.AC-6: Identities are proofed and bound to credentials and asserted in
interactions
PR.AC-7: Users, devices, and other assets are authenticated (e.g.,
single-factor, multi-factor) commensurate with the risk of the
transaction (e.g., individuals’ security and privacy risks and other
organizational risks)
PR.AT-1: All users are informed and trained

PR.AT-3: Third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, partners)
understand their roles and responsibilities

PR.DS-7: The development and testing environment(s) are separate
from the production environment
PR.DS-8: Integrity checking mechanisms are used to verify hardware
integrity

PR.IP-2: A System Development Life Cycle to manage systems is
implemented

78

DETECT (DE)

RESPOND (RS)

commitment, and coordination
among organizational entities),
processes, and procedures are
maintained and used to manage
protection of information systems and
assets.
Protective Technology (PR.PT):
Technical security solutions are
managed to ensure the security and
resilience of systems and assets,
consistent with related policies,
procedures, and agreements.
Anomalies and Events (DE.AE):
Anomalous activity is detected and
the potential impact of events is
understood.
Security Continuous Monitoring
(DE.CM): The information system
and assets are monitored to identify
cybersecurity events and verify the
effectiveness of protective measures.
Detection Processes (DE.DP):
Detection processes and procedures
are maintained and tested to ensure
awareness of anomalous events.
Communications (RS.CO): Response
activities are coordinated with
internal and external stakeholders
(e.g. external support from law
enforcement agencies).
Analysis (RS.AN): Analysis is

PR.PT-5: Mechanisms (e.g., failsafe, load balancing, hot swap) are
implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse
situations
DE.AE-2: Detected events are analyzed to understand attack targets and
methods
DE.AE-5: Incident alert thresholds are established

DE.CM-1: The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity
events

DE.DP-3: Detection processes are tested

RS.CO-5: Voluntary information sharing occurs with external
stakeholders to achieve broader cybersecurity situational awareness
RS.AN-3: Forensics are performed
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RECOVER
(RC)

conducted to ensure effective
response and support recovery
activities.
Communications (RC.CO):
Restoration activities are coordinated
with internal and external parties (e.g.
coordinating centers, Internet Service
Providers, owners of attacking
systems, victims, other CSIRTs, and
vendors).

RS.AN-5: Processes are established to receive, analyze and respond to
vulnerabilities disclosed to the organization from internal and external
sources (e.g. internal testing, security bulletins, or security researchers)
RC.CO-1: Public relations are managed

RC.CO-2: Reputation is repaired after an incident
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After mapping NIST Cybersecurity Framework 1.1 to HIPAA Security, there were 26 of
the 108 subcategories that could not be mapped. Also, of those that did map, there were two
HIPAA security standards listed as “addressable” standards only. NIST PR.IP-10: Response and
recovery plans are tested and PR.MA-1: Maintenance and repair of organizational assets are
performed and logged, with approved and controlled tools.
Both fall under the protection function of NIST Cybersecurity:
1. “Data Security (PR.DS): Information and records (data) are managed consistent
with the organization’s risk strategy to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of information (“Cybersecurity Framework Version 1 . 1 Released By
NIST - CalHIPAA,” 2019).”
2. “Information Protection Processes and Procedures (PR.IP): Security policies (that
address purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, and
coordination among organizational entities), processes, and procedures are
maintained and used to manage protection of information systems and assets”
(“Cybersecurity Framework Version 1 . 1 Released By NIST - CalHIPAA,” 2019).
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5
5.1

CHAPTER V DISCUSSION

Discussion of Results
Ransomware, hacking incidents, and unauthorized access appear to be on the rise in

healthcare. As healthcare is looking for a way to make systems interoperable, technology needs
to be viewed as a quality standard obtained and maintained. Medicaid and Medicare provide
some level of deeming status for an organization the receive some or one of the following
accreditations:
•

CARF – Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities

•

COA – Council on Accreditation

•

NCQA – National Committee for Quality Assurance

•

TJC – The Joint Commission

•

Utilization Review Accreditation Commission (URAC) (BHM Healthcare
Solutions, n.d.)

These accrediting organizations could consider adding additional technology standards to
address cybersecurity. The best option may be to require organizations to obtain certification in
NIST Cybersecurity, CIS CSC, COBIT 5, ISA 62443-2-1:2009, ISA 62443-3-3:2013, ISO/IEC
27001:2013 or HITRUST. It is essential to understand that cybersecurity is more than a series of
policies but a quality and governance effort.
HIPAA of 1996 and HITECH Act of 2009 are old policies that should be amended.
When the laws were written, they intended it to be scalable. However, the technology and
threats of that time are very different than those that exist today. Laptop, desktop, flash drives,
medical equipment should not be used without some level of encryptions. Many of the
unencrypted cases found on the HHS website were based on stolen equipment. If the Breach
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Notification Rule is considered to the letter of the law, this research could assume that all 2,346
cases in the study were based on unencrypted data. Further, HIPAA Security should be amended
to make all “addressable” standards “required.” Another law should encompass rules around
cybersecurity implementation requirements. HIPAA Security is not Cybersecurity. It is not
enough to teach about securing data without education on phishing and ransomware.
Finally, Appendix A includes a modified HHS OCR Breach Report form. The form
expands the data collection to include comprehensive information on the type of breach. Also, it
drills down on the HIPAA Privacy and Security policy implementation requirements. The
additional information will assist in determining the compliance of the “required” and
“addressable” in the HIPAA Act.
5.2

Limitations
The HHS OCR Report database is not comprehensive or inclusive of all the variables

needed for this study. The addition subcategories for Virus, Ransom, Malware, Phishing,
Unencrypted Data, Hacking Incidents, and Unauthorized Access came from searching the
keywords in the web description field. In the end, the only two HIPAA Security “addressable”
items analyzed were Unencrypted Data and Unauthorized Access. Although there were a total
of 2346 valid cases, there were only web descriptions for 1722 cases. The missing web
description could yield more comprehensive data if it were available. The web description is not
populated in the breaches currently under investigation. The information is available in the
archive file, however there are missing web descriptions in the archive cases as well.
Further, not all ransom cased are reported to HHS. The rule of HITECH Rule states if
PHI is “Unusable, Unreadable, or Indecipherable to Unauthorized Individuals,” then no reporting
is required. However, healthcare technology has changed drastically with phishing and malware,
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making it easier for cybercriminals to gain access to PHI.
Another limitation with the HHS data includes the ability of covered entities to choose
more than one option for the type of breach and the location of the breach. Eighty-two cases, 3
percent of the data, chose more than one type of breach. While 399 cases, 17 percent of the
cases, chose more than one location of the breach. The HHS database does not support
identifying if other hospital equipment affected by breaches. While reading the web description,
only one case was related to medical equipment. There was not enough data to determine if this
may be related to cases where there were less than 500 people affected. The law does not require
HHS to list breaches with less than 500 individuals affected.
The mapping process for NIST and HIPAA security was based on HIPAA Security
Standards. Although the mapping carried over from NIST 1.0 to NIST 1.1 to complete the
mapping process, there were several new standards not mapped. The original NIST 1.0 mapped
more categories based on the overall section in the HIPAA rule. The mapping for this research
only included specific HIPAA Security standards. Finally, although NIST 1.0 matched a HIPAA
Security Standard to each subcategory, the mapping of this study was to show the difference
between HIPAA Security and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
5.3

Future Research
NIST Cybersecurity standard mapped the subcategories to other security framework

standards. The standards include:
•

CIS CSC - Center for Internet Security Critical Security Controls for Effective
Cyber Defense

•

COBIT 5 - Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology -A
Business Framework for the Governance and Management of Enterprise IT
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•

ISA 62443-2-1:2009 - International Society of Automation Security for Industrial
Automation and Control Systems

•

ISA 62443-3-3:2013 - International Society of Automation Cybersecurity
Controls for Industrial Control Systems

•

ISO/IEC 27001:2013 International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and
International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) Information technology
security techniques information security management systems requirements

Future research could include a questionnaire to review organizations with accreditation
or certification on the above standards to determine whether it provided safeguards against
cybersecurity threats. The survey could address some of the questions not captured on the HHS
questionnaire and the web description provided on the web site.
5.4

Conclusions
The available data on general security breaches and specific breaches with ransomware

show alarming increases over time. Assessment of quantitative reports indicates the current
regulations are inadequate safeguards in today’s environment where risk has shifted from
damage from breached being inflicted on individual patients to the complete shut-down of
functions of institutions being at risk. Also, our qualitative review of cases indicates that the
current reporting system is inadequate for capturing severe cases that, in “worst-case scenarios,”
destroy a health care entity. It is high time that we seriously consider a revision of HIPAA. At a
minimum, standards from NIST should be implemented as rapidly as possible.
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Appendix A. Recommended Changes to the HHS OCR BREACH REPORT

BREACH PORTAL REQUIRED INFORMATION
All information with an asterisk is required.
GENERAL Information Screen
Please supply the required general information for the breach.

* Report Type: What type of breach report are you filing?

 Initial Breach Report
 Addendum to Previous Report

If Addendum to Previous Report is selected:

* Do you have a valid breach tracking number? A breach tracking number would have been
provided by OCR after January 1st, 2015. If you do not have a number, please select 'No.'

 Yes
o Breach Tracking Number: Please supply your breach tracking number.
 No
CONTACT Information Screen
Please supply the required contact information for the breach.

•
•
•

Are you a Covered Entity who experienced a breach, and are filing on behalf of your
organization?
Are you a Business Associate who experienced a breach, and are filing on behalf of a
Covered Entity?
Are you a Covered Entity filing because your Business Associate experienced a breach?
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If “Are you a Covered Entity who experienced a breach, and are filing on behalf of your
organization” was selected:
Covered Entity: Please provide the following information.
* Name of Covered Entity: (Name of Entity only (not of its representative), no abbreviations, no
acronyms):
* Type of Covered Entity
 Health Plan
 Healthcare Clearing House
 Healthcare Provider
* Street Address Line 1:

Street Address, Line 2:
* City:
* State: -- Choose State --

* ZIP:

Covered Entity Point of Contact Information
* First Name:
* Last Name:
* Email:
* Phone Number: (Include area code):

Usage
 Home/Cell
 Work
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If “Are you a Business Associate who experienced a breach, and are filing on behalf of a
Covered Entity” was selected
Business Associate: Completion of this section is required if the breach occurred at or by a
Business Associate or if you are filing on behalf of a Covered Entity.
* Name of Business Associate: (Name of Business Associate only (not of its representative),
no abbreviations, no acronyms):
* Street Address Line 1:
Street Address, Line 2:
* City:
* State: -- Choose State –
* ZIP:
Business Associate Point of Contact Information
* First Name:
* Last Name:
* Email:
* Phone Number: (Include area code):
* Usage
 Home/Cell
 Work
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Enter the contact information for all Covered Entities on whose behalf you are filing.
Covered Entity 1
* Name of Covered Entity: (Name of Entity only (not of its representative), no abbreviations,
no acronyms):
* Street Address Line 1:
Street Address, Line 2:
* City:
* State: -- Choose State –
* ZIP:

Point of Contact Information
* First Name:
* Last Name:
* Email:
* Phone Number: (Include area code):
* Usage
 Home/Cell
 Work
* Type of Covered Entity:
 Health Plan
 Healthcare Clearing House
 Healthcare Provider
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If “Are you a Covered Entity filing because your Business Associate experienced a breach” was
selected:
Covered Entity: Please provide the following information.
* Name of Covered Entity: (Name of Entity only (not of its representative), no abbreviations,
no acronyms):
* Type of Covered Entity:
 Health Plan
 Healthcare Clearing House
 Healthcare Provider
* Street Address Line 1:
Street Address, Line 2:
* City:
* State: -- Choose State –
* ZIP:

Covered Entity Point of Contact Information
* First Name:
* Last Name:
* Email:
* Phone Number: (Include area code):
Usage
 Home/Cell
 Work
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Business Associate: Completion of this section is required if the breach occurred at or by a
Business Associate.
* Name of Business Associate: (Name of Business Associate only, no abbreviations, no
acronyms):
* Street Address Line 1:
Street Address Line 2:
* City:
* State: -- Choose State -* ZIP:
Business Associate Point of Contact Information
* First Name:
* Last Name:
* Email:
* Phone Number: (Include area code):
Phone Number
Usage
 Home/Cell
 Work
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BREACH Information Screen
* Breach Affecting: How many individuals are affected by the breach?
 500 or More Individuals
 Fewer Than 500 Individuals
Breach Dates: Please provide the start and end date (if applicable) for the dates the breach
occurred in.
* Breach Start Date:
* Breach End Date:
Discovery Dates: Please provide the start and end date (if applicable) for the dates the breach
was discovered.
* Discovery Start Date:
* Discovery End Date:
* Approximate Number of Individuals Affected by the Breach:
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* Type of Breach (drop-down instructions available in the portal):
 Hacking/IT Incident (check all that apply)
 viruses
 malware
 ransomware
 keylogger on the network
 phishing and spear phishing attacks
 e-mail attachments that contain viruses
 unidentified persons obtaining access to systems
 unauthorized persons obtaining access to systems
 theft of PHI by hacking incident
 unauthorized Access of PHI by hacking incident
 Other, hacking incident
 Improper Disposal (check all that apply)
 improper disposal of PHI in trash/dumpster
 improper disposal of PHI in recycle bin
 improper disposal of unencrypted CD disposal
 improper disposal of unencrypted flash drive disposal
 improper disposal of unencrypted hard drive disposal
 improper disposal of unencrypted computer/laptop/server disposal
 improper disposal of unencrypted backup tapes disposal
 improper disposal of medical equipment
 improper disposal PHI found elsewhere (street, former employee, unknown
person)
 other, improper disposal, not by hacking incident, loss/missing, theft,
unauthorized access/disclosure
 Loss (check all that apply)
 loss/missing of PHI on unencrypted CD
 loss/missing of PHI on unencrypted flash drive
 loss/missing of PHI on unencrypted hard drive disposal
 loss/missing of PHI on unencrypted computer/laptop/server disposal
 loss/missing of PHI on unencrypted backup tapes
 loss/missing of PHI on medical equipment
 loss/missing of PHI paper records
 lost due to damage and/or opening of priority mail
 other, loss/missing not by hacking incident, improper disposal, theft, unauthorized
access/disclosure
 Theft (check all that apply)
 theft of PHI on unencrypted CD
 theft of PHI on unencrypted flash drive
 theft of PHI on unencrypted hard drive disposal
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theft of PHI on unencrypted computer/laptop/server disposal
theft of PHI on unencrypted backup tapes
theft of PHI on medical equipment
theft of PHI paper records
theft of PHI from Office/Workplace facility
theft of PHI from Car
theft of PHI from Home
other, theft not by hacking incident, improper disposal, loss/missing, unauthorized
access/disclosure

 Unauthorized Access/Disclosure (check all that apply)
 unauthorized access or disclosure involving employees
 unauthorized access or disclosure involving former employees
 accessing records outside the scope of their job responsibilities
 emailing PHI without encryption
 mailing error
 misdirected communications
 employee emailed PHI to personal or other public email account (Gmail, Live,
other)
 employee downloaded PHI to personal computer, laptop, or flash drive
 misconfigure firewall/server providing PHI access via the internet
 Other, unauthorized access/disclosure not by hacking incident, improper disposal,
loss/missing, theft
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* Location of Breach:
 Desktop Computer
 Electronic Medical Record
 Email
 Laptop
 Network Server
 Flash Drive
 Medical Equipment
 Photocopier
 Point-of-Sale Machine
 Other Portable Electronic Device
 Paper/Films
 Other
* Type of Protected Health Information Involved in Breach:
 Clinical
o Diagnosis/Conditions
o Lab Results
o Medications
o Other Treatment Information
 Demographic
o Address/ZIP
o Date of Birth
o Driver’s License
o Name
o SSN
o Other Identifier
 Financial
o Claims Information
o Credit Card/Bank Acct #
o Other Financial Information
 Other
* Type of Protected Health Information Involved in Breach (Other):
[4,000 characters limit]
* Brief Description of the Breach:
[4,000 characters limit]
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* Safeguards in Place Prior to Breach:
 None
 Privacy Rule Safeguards (Training, Policies and Procedures, etc.)

PRIVACY ADMINISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS
Standards

Sections

Implementation Specifications Yes

No

N/A

Personnel
designations

164.530(a)(1)

Personnel designations.







Training

164.530(b)(1)

Training







Safeguards

164.530(c)(1)

Safeguards







Complaints to the
164.530(d)(1)
covered entity

Documentation of complaints







Sanctions

164.530(e)(1)

Sanctions Policy







Mitigation

164.530(f)

Mitigation







Refraining from
intimidating or
retaliatory acts

164.530(g)

Refraining from intimidating or
retaliatory acts







Waiver of rights

164.530(h)

Waiver of rights







Policies and
procedures

164.530(i)(1)

Policies and procedures







164.530(i)(2)

Changes in law







164.530(i)(2)

Changes to privacy practices
stated in the notice







164.530(i)(2)

Changes to other policies or
procedures







Documentation

164.530(j)(1)

Retention period







Group health
plans

164.530(k)

Group health plans







Changes to
policies and
procedures
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 Security Rule Administrative Safeguards (Risk Analysis, Risk Management, etc.)
ADMINISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS
Standards

Security
Management
Process

Sections

Information
Access
Management



164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B)

Risk Management





164.308(a)(1)(ii)(C)

Sanction Policy





164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D)

Information System Activity
Review





Assigned Security
Responsibility





164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A)

Authorization and/or
Supervision







164.308(a)(3)(ii)(B)

Workforce Clearance Procedure







164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C)

Termination Procedures







164.308(a)(4)(ii)(A)

Isolating Health Care
Clearinghouse Functions























164.308(a)(4)(II)(B) Access Authorization
Access Establishment and
Modification

164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A) Security Reminders

Security Incident
Procedures

Alternative



164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C)

Security
Awareness and
Training

Yes No

164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) Risk Analysis

Assigned Security
164.308(a)(2)
Responsibility

Workforce
Security

Implementation Specifications

164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B)

Protection from Malicious
Software







164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C)

Log-in Monitoring







164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D) Password Management







164.308(a)(6)(ii)





164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) Data Backup Plan





164.308(a)(7)(ii)(B)

Disaster Recovery Plan





164.308(a)(7)(ii)(C)

Emergency Mode Operation
Plan









Contingency Plan

Response and Reporting

164.308(a)(7)(ii)(D) Testing and Revision Procedures
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164.308(a)(7)(ii)(E)

Applications and Data Criticality
Analysis





Evaluation

164.308(a)(8)

Evaluation





Business
Associate
Contracts and
Other
Arrangements

164.308(b)(1)

Written Contract or Other
Arrangement







 Security Rule Physical Safeguards (Facility Access Controls, Workstation Security, etc.)
PHYSICAL SAFEGUARDS
Standards

Facility
Access
Controls

Workstation
Use
Workstation
Security
Device and
Media
Controls

Sections

Implementation Specifications

Yes No

Alternative

164.310(a)(2)(i)

Contingency Operations







164.310(a)(2)(ii)

Facility Security Plan







164.310(a)(2)(iii)

Access Control and Validation
Procedures







164.310(a)(2)(iv)

Maintenance Records







164.310(b)

Workstation Use





164.310(c)

Workstation Security





164.310(d)(2)(i)

Disposal





164.310(d)(2)(ii)

Media Re-use





164.310(d)(2)(iii)

Accountability







164.310(d)(2)(iv)

Data Backup and Storage







 Security Rule Technical Safeguards (Access Controls, Transmission Security, etc.)
TECHNICAL SAFEGUARDS
Standards

Access
Control

Sections

Implementation Specifications

Yes

No

164.312(a)(2)(i)

Unique User Identification





164.312(a)(2)(ii)

Emergency Access Procedure





164.312(a)(2)(iii)

Automatic Logoff







164.312(a)(2)(iv)

Encryption and Decryption







Audit Controls





Audit Controls 164.312(b)
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Alternative

Integrity

Mechanism to Authenticate
Electronic Protected Health
Information





Person or Entity Authentication





164.312(e)(2)(i)

Integrity Controls







164.312(e)(2)(ii)

Encryption







164.312(c)(2)

Person or
Entity
164.312(d)
Authentication
Transmission
Security

NOTICE OF BREACH AND ACTIONS TAKEN Information Screen
Notice of Breach and Actions Taken: Please supply the required information about notices and
actions.
* Individual Notice Provided Start Date:
* Individual Notice Provided Projected/Expected End Date:
Was Substitute Notice Required?
 Yes or
o Fewer than 10
o 0 or more
 No
Was Media Notice Required?
 Yes
o Select State(s) and/or Territories in which media notice was provided:
-- Choose State –
 No
* Actions Taken in Response to Breach:
 Adopted encryption technologies
 Changed password/strengthened password requirements
 Created a new/updated Security Rule Risk Management Plan
 Implemented new technical safeguards
 Implemented periodic technical and nontechnical evaluations
 Improved physical security
 Performed a new/updated Security Rule Risk Analysis
 Provided business associate with additional training on HIPAA requirements
 Provided individuals with free credit monitoring
 Revised business associate contracts
 Revised policies and procedures
 Sanctioned workforce members involved (including termination)
 Took steps to mitigate harm
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 Trained or retrained workforce members
 Other
o * Describe Other Actions Taken: [4,000 characters limit]
ATTESTATION Information Screen
Please complete the Attestation form.
Under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. §552) and HHS regulations at 45 C.F.R. Part 5,
OCR may be required to release information provided in your breach notification. For breaches
affecting more than 500 individuals, some of the information provided on this form will be made
publicly available by posting on the HHS web site pursuant to § 13402(e)(4) of the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act (Pub. L. 111-5).
Additionally, OCR will use this information, pursuant to § 13402(i) of the HITECH Act, to
provide an annual report to Congress regarding the number and nature of breaches that are
reported each year and the actions taken to respond to such breaches. OCR will make every
effort, as permitted by law, to protect information that identifies individuals or that, if released,
could constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
I attest, to the best of my knowledge, that the above information is accurate.

* Name:

Date: [system generated]
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